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Abstract
This work studies how the introduction of competition to the side of the market offering
trading contracts affects the equilibrium investment profile in a bilateral investment game.
By using a common agency framework, where contracts are not exclusive, we find that the
equilibrium investment profile depends on the competitiveness of the equilibrium outcome.
Full efficiency can only be implemented when the trading outcome is the most competitive.
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1 Introduction
In many economic situations, parties undertake relation-specific investment to increase poten-
tial gains from the relationship. Consider for instance an insurer that researches on possible
contingencies to better suit the special needs for his contractor; or a seller that reduces the
production cost of an intermediate good that is specific to a downstream producer. Even if the
potential gains from trade increases, the ex-ante decision to undertake relation specific invest-
ment depends on the extent that the investing party can appropriate the gains arising from his
investment. Economists have extensively studied this subject and have shown that efficient
investment decisions fail to materialize whenever the investing party is not able to appropriate
all the benefits generated from his specific investment. In other words, transaction-specific
investments results into a fundamental transformation in market transactions, by reducing
the field of available alternatives from a large number (in the ex-ante bargaining situation)
to a small number (in the ex-post bidding situation), Williamson (1983). Then, economic
agents get wrong investment incentives due to the problem of being “held-up”, and decide to
undertake lower levels of investment. This has detrimental effects on resource allocation and
economic welfare.
The existence of the “hold-up” problem is generally traced to incomplete contracts, that
is, the inability of parties to write contracts depending on all relevant and publicly available
information.1 The economic literature has mainly focused on two different approaches to solve
this problem. The first approach, organization design, is closely related to the theory of the
firm and searches for conditions which determine when transactions should be undertaken
trough a price mechanism - market - or by fiat - firm. It also establishes provisions for asset
ownership and dictates that the residual right of control should be given to the party who
is more prompt to suffer from the ex-post opportunism by the other side, Hart (1995). The
second is the long-term contract approach. It focuses on establishing contractual provisions
such as default or option contracts, that can be enforced in case of disagreement, which
relaxes potential conflicts of interests between the parties. However, the main caveat is that
the previous solutions pre-assume the existence of economic institutions allowing for either a
1If specific investment was verifiable or enforceable ex-post, it will be in the interest of the contractual
parties to write compensation schemes linked to investment. Grossman & Hart (1986), Grout (1984), Hart
and Moore (1988) and Williamson (1985).
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clear definition and allocation of property rights and/or the existence of a third party able to
enforce ex-ante contracts. Hence, can we implement efficient levels of investment in a setting
with weak economic institutions? In the present work, we propose a very simple mechanism
consisting on introducing competition to one side of the market and allocating of the whole
bargaining power to this competing side.
We consider an economy with a single large producer/ buyer who must use a specific
input provided by different sellers. Consistent with a bilateral investing game, only one of the
sellers is aware of the technology that enables him to reduce the cost of input production, and
the producer/buyer invests to improve her valuation of the input by adapting her production
process to this specific input. Our objective is to see how the introduction of competition to
the side of the market offering trading contracts affects the equilibrium investment profile in
a bilateral investment game. Since we are interested in a situation where there is competition
in the market, we work in a set-up where the buyer can sign trading contracts with many
sellers at the same time. We find evidence of this type of contracts in the cycling industry,
where large brands of elaborated cycling components such as Shimano, Specialized and Trek
buy raw materials and other simple components from different suppliers. Another example is
provided by the financial sector, where a large firm establishes multiple banking relationships
and customers also hold multiple credit cards from different networks.2
In a common agency framework, where trading contracts are not exclusive, we find that
the equilibrium investment profile depends on the degree of competition in the trading game.
By allowing active sellers to coordinate their out of equilibrium trading offers we show that
the upper-bound on the transfer that each seller obtains depends on the “loss” on the trading
surplus generated when the buyer excludes him from trade. This “loss” directly depends on
the gains from trade that the rest of sellers are able to attain. Hence, the higher the number
of sellers coordinating their out of equilibrium offers aimed at excluding any seller, the larger
the gains from trade that can be generated and the lower is the equilibrium transfer of the
former. The equilibrium outcome is more competitive the higher the number of active sellers
coordinating their out of equilibrium offers.
We show that the equilibrium investment profile depends on this “intensive” degree of
competition ex-post, which arises in the trading game once specific investment is made. We
2Open listing agreements is another example of non-exclusivity in the real estate market.
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obtain that full efficiency can only be implemented when competition is the most intense.
Here, the offering parties appropriate their marginal contribution to the trading surplus. In
situations where the equilibrium outcome is less competitive, full efficiency is never guaran-
teed. The “hold-up” problem affects the receiving party while the offering party tends to
over-invest. With low competition, each seller obtains more that his marginal contribution
to the trading surplus and the gains appropriated by the investing seller are larger than the
increase on the surplus generated by his investment. We also find a relationship between the
equilibrium investment profile and the “extensive” degree of competition, which corresponds
to the number of active sellers in the industry. The higher the number of active sellers,
the equilibrium investment profile tends to efficiency regardless of the competitiveness of the
trading outcome.
We further explore which level of competition leads to a larger ex-ante efficiency, and we
analyze which degree of competition is preferred by the side of the market offering the trading
contracts. In our model, the most preferred equilibrium is not always the one that makes
competition less severe, since the investment profile depends on competition. In this regard,
the purpose of an investing party might not longer be to appropriate as much gains from the
relationship as possible, because this will have an effect on the investment decision of the other
party, and so in the overall potential gains. In some situations, it is beneficial to distribute
potential gains from trade evenly among different participants, and this is obtained when
the outcome of the trading game is very competitive. Moreover, we show that in situations
where the level of competition is low, the results are also influenced by the sensitivity of
the equilibrium allocation on investment. When a seller is more efficient that the rest, due
to his specific investment, he is indirectly putting a constraint on the transfers of the other
sellers. An increase of investment of the seller entails a reduction of the amount traded by
the non-investing sellers. If this effect turns out to be small, the incentives of the sellers
are aligned and they prefer a more favorable partition of the surplus. Different degrees of
competition are preferred when the previous effect is big. While the investing seller opts for
an equilibrium where the investment is maximal, this is not the case for the non-investing
sellers. This comes from the fact that investments are strategic complements, then a higher
investment of the buyer entails larger investment of the seller which in turn creates lower
trade for the non-investing sellers.
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This strategic complementarity, also explains why the maximization of welfare is not
always obtained under situations when the outcome is more competitive. The inefficiency
created to one side of the market can restore efficiency to the other side, leading to larger
potential gains from trade. Surprisingly, we get that lower competitive outcomes ex-post
can lead to higher levels of welfare. Therefore, a competition authority should be careful in
analyzing an industry where ex-ante specific investments are important, because promoting
competitive outcomes might fail to maximize the total welfare that can be generated in the
market.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section (2), briefly discusses the related
literature. Before introducing the formal set-up of the model, in section (3), we provide a
simple numerical example. Later, we proceed by solving the game backwards. Therefore, in
section (5.1) we study the properties of our equilibrium allocation and the equilibrium transfers
are characterized in section (5.2). In section (5.3), we obtain the equilibrium investment
profile. Equilibria comparison is undertaken in section (6). We start by analyzing which is
the Pareto dominant equilibrium by the offering parties and we continue by ranking equilibria
in terms of welfare. Finally, section (7) concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related Literature
The present work builds on the literature on markets and contracts. In this literature instead
of considering the impossibility of contracting on some states of nature or actions, there are
limits on the number of parties that can be part of the same contract. In this paper, we use the
most recent set-up where trading contracts are non-exclusive, and a common agent can freely
sign multiple bilateral trading contracts with different parties.3 The first theoretical work to
consider a general model of contracting between one agent and multiple principals is due to
Segal (1999). In a general framework, he shows that with the absence of direct externalities,
the contracting outcome is efficient.4 However, in a bidding game - where multiple principals
propose trading contracts to the common agent - inefficiencies can arise from the coexistence
of offers made by different parties. In this regard, Bernheim & Whinston (1986) show that
3Earlier studies have centered the analysis on exclusive contracts, this is the spirit of Akerlof (1970), Roth-
schild & Stiglitz (1976) and Aghion & Bolton (1987).
4There are no externalities when the principals’ payoffs depend only on their own trade with the agent.
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an equilibrium always exists and it is efficient in the absence of direct externalities.5
While it has been shown that under some mild conditions a unique efficient outcome
always exists, it has been proven that there is multiplicity in the equilibrium payoffs, Chiesa
& Denicolo` (2009).6 Restricting to non-linear schedules, the payoffs of the principals - the
ones that offer the trading contracts - depend on the transfers or fixed payment that they
obtain for the equilibrium amount traded. In a common agency framework, this is determined
by the threat of any principal to be excluded from trade, and this threat pins down to which
type of “latent” or out of equilibrium contracts are submitted by the rest of the principals. If
the principals submit latent contracts such that there exists optimal collective replacement of
a given principal, then the equilibrium transfers are truthful in the sense that each principal
appropriates his marginal contribution to the surplus. Conversely, if the latent contracts
submitted are such that any principal is unilaterally replaced by the most efficient seller, the
equilibrium transfers are the ones where the rent of the common agent is minimized. The
authors establish which strategies will support this last equilibrium. By giving structure to the
out of equilibrium offers such that principals can coordinate their out of equilibrium trading
contracts to exclude any other principal, we obtain a characterization of the equilibrium
payoffs that lie between the two previous equilibria.
In a more recent paper, Chiesa & Denicolo` (2012) undertake comparative statics of the two
extreme equilibria. They show that the equilibrium where the rent of the buyer is minimized
is Pareto dominant from the parties offering the contracts, and state that truthful strategies
are not in general very attractive. This comes from the fact that the potential gains from
trade are irrelevant of the distribution of rents and those who submit contracts always prefers
an equilibrium where the distribution is more favorable to them. We challenge their finding
by introducing a previous stage where parties can undertake specific self-investment before
the contracting stage takes place. Moreover, by introducing an investment stage in our game,
we are able to compare equilibria with regards to the welfare obtained. This analysis has
not been carried out in the markets and contracts literature, where the different type of
equilibria are only a different way to distribute the rents from trade, and welfare remains
5The authors consider an equilibrium where the principals submit global truthful schedules.
6Indeed, the authors show that the set of equilibrium payoffs is a semi-open hyper-rectangle. Additionally,
Martimort & Stole (2009) show multiplicity of equilibria in a public common agency game and offer strategies
for equilibrium refinement.
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unchanged. Therefore, in our model, the redistribution of rents has implications on the
investment decisions of the parties and on the final dimension of those gains.
In this regard, the present work is closely related to the “hold-up” literature where an
early formulation is due to Klein, Crawford & Alchian (1978) & Williamson (1979, 1983). In
those papers, the “hold-up” problem arises due to the fact that parties are unable to bargain
over specific investment once they have been made as they are unverifiable. In our model the
“hold-up” problem does not arise from non verifiability but from the fact that investments are
not contractable. The literature concludes that in the absence of ex-ante contracts, investment
is likely to be inefficiently low under any possible bargaining game, Grossman & Hart (1986)
and Hart & Moore (1990). The literature has then centered in ways of designing a mechanism
to restore the efficient levels of investment as in Aghion, Dewatripont & Rey (1994), Chung
(1991) and Edlin & Reichelstein (1996). However, in our model ex-ante contracts are not
considered. This relates to the recent literature on competition and the “hold-up” problem
as in Cole, Mailath & Postlewaite (2001a, 2001b); Mailath, Postlewaite & Samuelson (2013);
Felli & Roberts (2012); Makowski (2004) and Samuelson (2013). However, all those models
consider a matching mechanism where, once investment has been undertaken, agents decide
on the trading partner. Hence, investment works as a mechanism to increase the outside
option giving higher incentives to invest. Departing from this literature, the offering part of
the market competes by offering trading contracts to the monopolistic side.
3 Numerical example
Before presenting the formal model, we expose a simple numerical example that illustrates
some of the results of the paper. Consider an economy with a common buyer and three
competing sellers (i=1,2,3) producing an homogeneous good, whose utility and cost functions
are respectively given by:
U(X | b) = 10 + (9× b+ 1)× log(X)−K × b;
C1(x1 | σ) = 2x
2
1
σ + 1
− ψ × σ; Ci(xi) = 2x2i for i = 2, 3,
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where the buyer and seller 1 are able to undertake a discreet investment decision b ∈ {0, 1}
and σ ∈ {0, 1}, that increases the utility of consumption and reduces the cost of production
respectively. The total amount traded is the sum of the individual amounts X = x1+x2+x3,
and the fixed cost of investment for the buyer and the seller are K > 0 and ψ > 0 respectively.
Later in the paper, we elaborate more on our notion of competition and this depends on the
proportion of the trading surplus that the sellers appropriate. For simplicity, we present
here the results for the two extreme equilibria. Hence, the most competitive equilibrium is
the one where each seller appropriates his marginal contribution to the trading surplus. In
the least competitive equilibrium, the rent of the buyer is minimized. The following table
presents the bounds for the fixed costs below which each party decides to invest. In brackets
we represent the investment decision of the other party. The first column stands for the
investment thresholds under efficiency, while the second and the third are for the highest and
the lowest level of competition respectively.
Bounds Efficient Highest competition Lowest competition
K{σ=0} 5.71 0.244 0
K{σ=1} 7.012 1.34 0.979
ψ{b=0} 0.143 0.143 0.1614
ψ{b=1} 1.43 1.43 1.614
Figure 1: Bounds below which the parties decide to invest. The brackets stand for the investment
decision of the other side of the market.
Compared to efficiency, the common buyer decides to invest less often in equilibrium,
and the likelihood of investment is larger whenever the trading outcome is more competitive.
The contrary applies for the seller, whose incentive to invest is higher in a less competitive
equilibrium, and the thresholds of investment in the most competitive equilibrium coincide
with efficiency. Since the investment bounds increase with the investment of the other party,
investment decisions are strategic complements. This complementarity leads to situations
where, in a less competitive equilibrium, the buyer is more prompt to invest. This happens
whenever the fixed cost of investment of the seller is ψ ∈ (1.43, 1.614), which makes the
investment threshold for the buyer to be larger in the least competitive equilibrium, i.e.,
KLC{σ=1} = 0.979 > 0.244 = K
HC
{σ=0}. Where LC and HC stands for the lowest and highest
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level of competition respectively.
In the table below, we expose the equilibrium payoffs of the sellers depending on the
equilibrium investment profile. In the columns, we represent all the possible investment
profiles and the rows stand for the two extreme equilibria considered. Because investment
decisions depend on the level of competition ex-post, it might be beneficial for the sellers
to end-up with a more competitive outcome, since this gives more incentives for the buyer
to invest. The red numbers represent the payoffs for the investing seller, and we see that
he is better with higher levels of competition if the buyer changes his investment decision,
i.e., piHC1 (b = 1, σ = 1) = 3.465 > 0.375 = pi
LC
1 (b = 0, σ = 1). This is also the case for the
non investing sellers even for an unchanged investment of the buyer piHCi (b = 1, σ = 0) =
2.02 > 1.47 = piLC1 (b = 1, σ = 1), represented in blue in the table. Here, a more competitive
equilibrium gives higher payoffs since it reduces the investment of the competing seller.
(b, σ) = (0, 0) (1, 0) (0, 1) (1, 1)
piHC1 (b, σ) 0.202 2.02 0.346 3.465
piHCi (b, σ) 0.202 2.02 0.143 1.43
piLC1 (b, σ) 0.214 2.14 0.375 3.755
piLCi (b, σ) 0.214 2.14 0.147 1.47
Figure 2: Sellers’ payoffs depending on the level of competition and ex-ante investment profile.
Because the investment equilibrium profile depends on the degree of competition ex-post,
the offering parties may prefer lower levels of competition and welfare may be maximized with
lower levels of ex-post competition. To illustrate this last point, consider that the fixed costs
of investment of the seller and the buyer are between ψ ∈ (1.43, 1.614) and K ∈ (0.244, 0.979)
respectively. Notice that, for this range of cost parameters, both equilibria are inefficient since
efficiency requires only the buyer to invest. Nevertheless, in the most competitive equilibrium
nobody invests, and in the least competitive both parties invest. To see which equilibrium
performs better, we compare the welfare obtained in both equilibria WHC = TS{b=σ=0}
and WLC = TS{b=σ=1} −K − ψ. Where TS{b,σ} stands for the trading surplus that can be
generated for a given investment profile (b, σ), and this is equal to the utility from consumption
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minus the cost of production. The difference in welfare is then
WHC −WLC = TS{b=σ=0}− (TS{b=σ=1}−K −ψ) = 9.35− (16.5−K −ψ) = −7.15 +K +ψ,
and for the extreme values of the investment costs, i.e. ψ¯ = 1.61 and K¯ = 0.97, we get
WHC −WLC = −7.15 + 1.61 + 0.97 = −4.53 < 0.
Therefore, for the investment costs considered, the lowest degree of competition does
better than the highest, and inefficiency of one side of the market restores efficiency to the
other side.7
4 Model
We consider a bilateral investment game where a monopolistic buyer trades with many ex-
ante identical sellers. In our model, there are N exogenous sellers indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., N},
who produce an homogeneous specific input for the buyer. We have a game consisting of two
b
Buyer
· · ·Seller 1 Seller 2 Seller N
σ
(x1, T1) (x2, T2) · · · (xN , TN )
Figure 3: Bilateral investment game with N competing sellers.
stages that are played sequentially. In stage one, specific investment takes place. Here, only
seller 1 can invest in a cost-reducing technology, that allows him to produce more efficiently.
The amount of investment is a continuous variable σ ≥ 0, with a convex cost ψ(σ). The buyer
7The calculation of the social surplus and equilibrium allocation are available upon request to the author.
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also undertakes specific investment to enhance her valuation of the total amount traded. She
takes a binary decision whether or not to invest b = {0, 1}, and incurs a fixed costs of K. This
binary investment is consistent with the buyer’s decision on whether to adapt his production
process to the input provided by the sellers. We assume that investing parties do not have
any budget constraint because they are not financially restrained on the amount of investment
they take.
In stage two, each seller trades with the common buyer. As in Chiesa & Denicolo` (2009),
we consider a bidding game in which trade is modeled as a first-price auction in which the
sellers simultaneously submit a menu of contracts and the buyer then chooses the quantity
she purchases from each. A typical trading contract is a pair mi = (xi, Ti), where xi ≥ 0 is
the quantity seller i is willing to supply and Ti ≥ 0 is the corresponding total payment or
transfer from the buyer towards seller i. Because trade is voluntary, we require that the null
contract is always offered in equilibrium, i.e. m0i = (0, 0). The moves of the game are then.
t0 t1 t2 t3
Stage 1 Stage 2
Investments
(b, σ)
Bidding game Buyer
chooses offers
Execution
Payoffs
Our model is one of complete information, hence the equilibrium concept is sub-game
perfect Nash (SPNE). Even if investment is observable, it is not contractable and this is
because investment cannot be enforced by a third party.8 We proceed by analyzing the
payoffs and the surplus generated from trade.
4.1 Payoffs and trading surplus
The payoffs of the buyer and the sellers are quasi-linear in transfers.9 The buyer obtains
Π(b) = U (X | b)−
N∑
i=1
Ti −K × b, (4.1)
8Additionally, the amount of trade that a single seller offers to the buyer cannot be made conditional on
the amount of trade that the buyer undertakes with other sellers. Hence, our model is one of private agency.
9This assumption means that all parties have a constant marginal utility for money. Furthermore, this allows
us both to technically reduce the complexity of the problem and focus our analysis on welfare comparison.
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where X =
∑N
i=1 xi is the total quantity traded, and the seller’s 1 payoff is
pi1(σ) = T1 − C (x1 | σ)− ψ(σ). (4.2)
For the rest of the sellers, the payoff does not directly depend on the investment profile
and it is equal to
pii = Ti − C (xi) , for all i 6= 1. (4.3)
Finally, given the vectors of investment (b, σ) the maximal trading surplus is
TS∗(b, σ) = max
x1,...,xn
U(x1 + . . .+ xn | b)− C(x1 | σ)−∑
i 6=1
C(xi)
 , (4.4)
and x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗N ) is the vector of quantities that solves the problem. For later use, we
denote by X∗{−H} =
∑
i/∈H x
∗
i , the sum of the efficient quantities without taking the quantities
of the subset of sellers in H. We finish by stating the assumptions regarding the utility and
costs functions:
1. U ′x(·) > 0, U ′′xx(·) < 0, U(X | b = 1) > U(X) and U ′x(X | b = 1) > U ′x(X),
2. C ′x(·) > 0, C ′′xx(·) > 0, C ′σ(·) < 0, C ′′xσ(·) < 0, ψ′σ(σ) > 0 and ψ′′σσ(σ) > 0,
3. limX→0 U ′x(·) = +∞, limX→∞ U ′x(·) = 0, limxi→0C ′x(·) = 0 and limxi→∞C ′x(·) = +∞.
5 Analysis
We solve the model backwards and we obtain the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
We first state the equilibrium of stage two, represented by an equilibrium allocation and trans-
fer, i.e. (xe, T e). After describing the properties of the equilibrium allocation, we characterize
a subset of the equilibrium transfers by assuming that sellers are able to coordinate their out
of equilibrium offers. Later, we characterize the equilibrium investment profile. Finally, we
undertake equilibrium comparison where we rank equilibria with regards to Pareto dominance
and welfare.
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5.1 Allocation in the trading game
The equilibrium allocation in the trading game depends on the investment decisions under-
taken at stage one of the game. Here, we characterize the equilibrium allocation for a given
vector of investment (b, σ). Because the production cost of each seller only directly depends
on the amount of input he produces, his individual payoff is not directly affected by the trad-
ing contracts submitted by all other sellers. Hence, given the contracts of all other sellers
each seller effectively plays a bilateral trading game with the buyer where he has the whole
bargaining power. Hence, when submitting a contract, he maximizes the potential gains from
trade that can be generated between him and the buyer.10
U
(
X¯∗−i + x
∗
i | b
)−∑
j 6=i
Tj − C(x∗i | σ) > U
(
X¯∗−i + xˆi | b
)−∑
j 6=i
Tj − C(xˆi | σ); for any xˆi ≥ 0.
In words, seller i does not profit by deviating from x∗i to any xˆi. Since this holds true for
every seller i ∈ N . Consequently, the efficient allocation is indeed a Nash equilibrium defined
by the following system of equations:
U ′x(X
∗ | b) = C ′x(x∗1 | σ) for i = 1,
U ′x(X
∗ | b) = C ′x(x∗i ) for all i 6= 1,
(5.1)
where the marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal costs of production.
We proceed to analyze how the efficient allocation changes with the investment undertaken
at stage one. The result is shown in the following lemma, whose proof, presented in the
appendix, page 39, comes directly from the previous system of equations.
Lemma 1. In an equilibrium with the efficient allocation:
i) for a given investment of the buyer, an increase on the investment by seller 1 rises the
amount of trade between the buyer and seller 1, but decreases the amount of trade with all
other sellers. The total amount traded increases.
dx∗1
dσ
> 0;
dx∗j
dσ
< 0 for all j 6= 1 and ∂
∂σ
X∗ > 0.
10The first and the second conditions are called “individual excludability” and “bilateral efficiency” in the
market and contracts literature Bernheim & Whinston (1996) and Segal (1999).
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ii) For a given investment of the seller, the amount of trade for each seller increases.
x∗i (1, σ) > x
∗
i (0, σ) ∀i ∈ N.
For a given investment of the buyer, the higher the investment undertaken by seller 1 the
more efficient he becomes with respect to the other sellers. In the trading stage, the buyer
substitutes trading from the other sellers to seller 1. Nevertheless, this substitution effect is
of second order, since the economy in aggregate is more efficient, the total amount traded is
higher. We denote by the “allocative externality” the magnitude on the decrease of trade to
the other sellers, and this depends on the primitives of the economy.11 With regard to the
second part of the lemma, as long as the investment of the seller does not change, the relative
efficiency of the sellers stays the same, and if the buyer decides to invest, she trades a higher
amount with every seller. In this regard, the investment of the buyer works as a public good
and all sellers benefit from her investment.
5.2 Equilibrium transfers
By restricting attention to the efficient allocation, we proceed to characterize the equilibrium
transfers. The literature on markets and contracts has shown that in the absence of restrictions
on the trading offers, there is multiplicity in the equilibrium transfers. Here, we focus on
a subset of equilibrium transfers which are obtained by assuming that sellers are able to
coordinate their out of equilibrium offers aimed at excluding any seller i from trade. The
following two definitions are crucial to characterize the equilibrium transfers.
Definition 1. (Coordination) A set H of sellers coordinate their offers if the gains from
11In our model we have assumed that sellers produce products that are homogeneous. However, the degree
of substitutability will have a strong effect on the externality that investment by one seller creates to the equi-
librium allocation of others. With perfect homogenous products, the buyer can perfectly substitute products
from sellers and we expect that the indirect externality coming from investment of seller 1 is big. In our
model the degree of substitutability depends on the primitives of the economy, that is, on the convexity of the
cost function. Conversely, if products have some degree of heterogeneity, the buyer will not reduce much the
amount that she trades with other sellers after an increase of investment by seller 1. Therefore, the degree of
the indirect externality will depend on the product substitutability. I am thankful to professor Sa´nchez-Pague´s
for this observation.
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trade that can be generated between them and the buyer is the largest.
VH
(
X∗−{H} | b
)
= max
{xj}j∈H
U
X∗−{H} + ∑
j∈H
xj | b
−∑
j∈H
C(xj | σ)
 . (5.2)
We denote by x˜j(· | H) the quantity that solves the problem in expression (5.2). By
assuming that sellers are able to coordinate their offers we define the loss of exclusion of a
given seller i.
Definition 2. (Exclusion loss) Those are the trading gains that cannot be realized due to
the exclusion from trade of a given seller.
The loss of exclusion for a given seller is directly related to the gains than can be attained
by the rest of the sellers, and those gains depend on the number of sellers coordinating their
out of equilibrium offers.12
Following Chiesa & Denicolo` (2009), we know that the difference of the gains from trade
that can be generated between the sellers in Ji and the common buyer with and without any
seller i are equal to
VJi
(
X∗−{Ji} | b
)
− VJi
(
X∗−{Ji,i} | b
)
,
where
VJi
(
X∗−{H} | b
)
= max
{xj}j∈Ji
U
X∗−{H} + ∑
j∈Ji
xj | b
−∑
j∈Ji
C(xj)
 .
With simple algebra, and assuming that the sellers in Ji are able to coordinate their out
of equilibrium offers, we obtain that the “loss” of exclusion of seller i by the set Ji is equal to
Li (Ji) =
U (X∗ | b)−∑
j∈Ji
C(x∗j )
− VJi (X∗−{Ji,i} | b) , (5.3)
where
VJi
(
X∗−{Ji,i} | b
)
= max
{xj}j∈Ji
U
X∗−{Ji,i} + ∑
j∈Ji
xj | x˜i = 0, b
−∑
j∈Ji
C(xj)
 . (5.4)
12In the literature of markets and contracts, this out of equilibrium contracts are called “latent” contracts
and those are the offers or trading contracts that are never accepted by the buyer, but effectuate a constraint
on the equilibrium transfer of sellers.
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As before, x˜j(· | Ji) is the amount of trade that solves the previous expression. The “loss”
of exclusion is computed by putting equal to zero the trading quantity of seller i, keeping
constant the production of the seller not in Ji, and choosing optimally the quantities of the
sellers belonging to Ji.
13 The convexity of the cost function, makes it straightforward to see
that the “loss” of exclusion Li(Ji) is weakly decreasing in Ji : Ji ⊃ J ′i =⇒ Li(J ′i) ≤ Li(Ji).14
That is, the more the number of sellers coordinating their out of equilibrium offers, the larger is
the trading surplus that they can generate and the lower is the “loss” of exclusion. Regarding
the quantities that are submitted in the out of equilibrium offers, we introduce the following
lemma that will be useful for the rest of the paper.
Lemma 2. For any investment profile (b, σ) and any Ji, the total amount traded is higher
when all sellers effectuate trade with the buyer.
X∗(b, σ) > X∗−{Ji,i}(b, σ) +
∑
j∈Ji
x˜j(b, σ | Ji), for any i ∈ N.
and
x˜j(b, σ | J ′i) > x˜j(b, σ | Ji) > x∗i (b, σ); ∀j ∈ J, J ′ and J ′ ⊂ J.
The formal proof is in the appendix, page 39. From to the convexity of the cost function,
the increase of the total amount traded, due to the extra seller, always dominates the increase
on the amount traded from the subset of sellers Ji. It is immediate to see that the individual
amount that any seller j ∈ Ji submits in his out of equilibrium contract, is larger than his
efficient amount. Because those offers aim at excluding one seller from trade, they have to
offer a larger amount to the buyer.
Because in our model trade is voluntary and the sellers have the whole bargaining power,
the equilibrium transfer of any seller i is the maximal monetary amount such that the common
buyer is indifferent between trading or excluding him from trade.15 Hence, the equilibrium
13Chiesa & Denicolo` (2009) consider the case where the set of sellers is a singleton, and we extend the case
for any number of sellers. Using a similar methodology it can be shown the existence of the strategies that will
support the equilibrium transfers.
14In general this will be strictly decreasing.
15Chiesa & Denicolo` (2009) talk about the “threat” that a given seller is replaced from trade. They state
that the upper-bound of the transfer that each seller can ask for supplying the efficient amount x∗ depends
on the threat of being excluded from trade, and this is related on how aggressively any other seller bids for
quantities that are larger than the efficient ones.
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transfer for any seller i cannot be greater than the “loss” of exclusion Li (Ji) for any Ji as
the buyer will decide not to trade with him. This cannot be lower, as seller i has a profitable
deviation to increase it. Hence, we center attention to the case where the equilibrium transfer
equals to this “loss” of exclusion T ei (Ji) = Li (Ji).
Now, we can easily obtain the equilibrium payoffs in the trading game, which are stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For a given Ji, and an investment profile (b, σ), the equilibrium payoffs of
the sellers are:
pi1 (b, σ | J1) = TS∗(b, σ)− T˜ S−1(b | J1)− ψ(σ); for i = 1, (5.5)
pii (b, σ | Ji) = TS∗(b, σ)− T˜ S−i(b, σ | Ji); for i 6= 1, (5.6)
and the one of the common buyer is
Π (b, σ | J) = TS∗(b, σ)−
∑
i
(
TS∗(b, σ)− T˜ S−i(b, σ | Ji)
)
−K × b, (5.7)
where T˜ S−i(b, σ | Ji) is the maximal trading surplus that can be generated when a subset of
sellers Ji coordinate their out of equilibrium offers.
ii) ∂
(
T˜ S−i (b, σ | Ji)
)
/∂Ji > 0, and for |Ji| < N − 1 each seller obtains more than his
marginal contribution to the trading surplus.
The proof is presented in the appendix, page 40. When all active sellers coordinate
their out of equilibrium offers i.e. Ji = N \ {i} = J¯i, each seller appropriates his marginal
contribution to the surplus and the trading gains are evenly distributed to all players. In this
case, we consider that the equilibrium outcome is competitive since in this equilibrium, and
for a given investment profile, the partition of the trading surplus is the one that minimizes
the payoffs of the side of the market offering the trading contracts.16 For a lower number of
sellers coordinating their out of equilibrium offers i.e. |Ji| < N \ {i}, the distribution of the
16In this case, the equilibrium payoffs coincide with the so called truthful equilibrium. A strategy is said
to be truthful relative to a given action if it truly reflects the sellers’ marginal preference for another action
relative to the given action. However, in a framework of private common agency with no direct externalities,
truthful means that each principal can ask for payments that differ from his true valuations of the proposed
trade only by a constant.
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gains from trade is biased in favor of the sellers and the rent of the common buyer is reduced.
In those cases, we consider that the equilibrium outcome is less competitive, because each
seller appropriates more than his marginal contribution to the surplus.
Having identified the equilibrium payoffs, we proceed to study stage one of the game when
investment decision are taken.
5.3 Investment profile
We begin this section by characterizing the efficient investment profile and we proceed with
the equilibrium. Efficiency serves as a benchmark to compare with equilibrium, and allows
us to see whether full efficiency can be restored in situations where ex-ante contracts are not
considered. We see that the decisions to invest of both sides of the market depend on the
competitiveness of the equilibrium outcome, because this has a direct effect on the part of the
trading surplus that each party is able to appropriate.
5.3.1 Efficient investment
The efficient vector of investment is the one that arises when the investing parties appropriate
all the gains coming from their own investment. The efficient investment is then uniquely
characterized by the solution of the following system of equations
ψ′σ(σE) = −C ′σ
(
x∗1(b, σ
b
E) | σbE
)
, ∀ b; (5.8)
K

≤ TS∗(1, σ1E)− TS∗(0, σ0E)−
(
ψ(σ1E)− ψ(σ0E)
) ≡ KE then b = 1
> KE then b = 0.
(5.9)
The seller sets the level of investment such that the marginal reduction of the production
costs equals the marginal cost of investment. Similarly, the buyer invests if the fixed cost
of investment K is lower than the increase on welfare, represented by the threshold KE. A
characteristic of the efficient investment profile, that also carries over in equilibrium, is that
investments are strategic complements. Hence the more one of the parties invests, the higher
are the incentives of the other party to increase investment. Here, this result comes from
a variant of super-modularity. From lemma 1, we know that the investment of one party
18
always increases the total amount of trade, and through this the trade allocation, the value
of investment by one party increases the marginal return to the other party’s investment.17
5.3.2 Equilibrium investment profile
In equilibrium, as the investing party does not appropriate all the benefits coming from
investment, the implementation of the efficient investment profile is not always possible. In-
terestingly, we see that efficiency can only be implemented whenever the equilibrium outcome
of the trading game is the most competitive. In the analysis that follows, we consider both
the “intensive” and “extensive” degree of competition. The former takes into account how
many sellers coordinate their out of equilibrium offers aimed at excluding any other seller from
trade. The latter, considers how the equilibrium investment profile depends on the number
of active sellers in the industry.
Definition 3. (“Intensive” Competition) An equilibrium outcome is more competitive
the lower the partition of the trading surplus that a seller can appropriate. Hence, for a given
number of sellers N and a given investment profile, the most competitive equilibria is when
|Ji| = N − 1 = J¯i. The least competitive is when |Ji| = 1 = J i.
5.3.3 “Intensive” competition
The ex-post level of competition depends on how many sellers coordinate their out of equi-
librium offers. The larger the number of those sellers, the higher are the gains from trade
that can be obtained excluding any seller i, and the lower is his “loss” of exclusion. The
equilibrium investment decisions are best-response actions, and the following definition states
an equilibrium in the investing game.
17We have proven in lemma 1 that the amount traded with each seller increases if the buyer is investing, this
implies that for a given level of seller’s investment we have x∗1(1, σ) > x
∗
1(0, σ) and together with assumption
C′′xσ(·) < 0 we obtain that the right hand side of (5.8) increases with the level of investment of the buyer.
∂(rhs) = −C′σ(x∗1(1, σ) | σ) + C′σ(x∗1(0, σ) | σ) = −
∫ x∗1(1,σ)
x∗1(0,σ)
C′′xσ(τ)dτ > 0,
where the above is true due to lemma 1. A similar argument can be used to see that the investment threshold
of the buyer increases with the investment of the seller. In the case that the investment of the buyer is
continuous i.e. b ≥ 0, we have investment complementarity if the function TS∗(b, σ) is super-modular in (b, σ)
(i.e TS∗bσ(b, σ) > 0; see Donald Topkins 1978).
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Definition 4. The vector (beJ , σ
e
J) constitutes an equilibrium, if and only if:
beJ ∈ argmax
b
Π (b, σeJ | J) ,
σeJ ∈ argmaxσ pi1 (b
e
J , σ | J) .
Because the equilibrium payoff depends on the set of sellers belonging to J , we obtain a
direct link between the degree of competition in the trading game and the equilibrium invest-
ment profile. It this regard, we are interested to know whether the efficient investment profile
can be implemented in equilibrium. This result is introduced in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The efficient investment profile is implementable if and only if the outcome
of the trading game is the most competitive i.e. Ji = N \ {i} = J¯i.
Investment decisions depend on how each party appropriates the gains coming from invest-
ment. In the most competitive equilibrium, the gains from trade are evenly distributed and
each seller obtains his marginal contribution of the trading surplus. As a result, the investing
seller appropriates the increase of the trading surplus coming from his investment. This is
never the case when the outcome of the trading game is less competitive. In this case, each
seller obtains more than his marginal contribution of the trading surplus, which distorts the
incentives to invest efficiently. Hence, given the investment decision of the buyer, the seller
always invests efficiently in the most competitive equilibrium. Because the buyer takes the
efficient level of investment, under some values for the fixed cost of investment, we obtain the
result stated in the proposition. We refer to the appendix for the formal proof, page 41.
From the previous result, we can easily characterize the investment profile when the equi-
librium outcome of the trading game is the most competitive. This is introduced in the
following corollary whose proof is also relegated to the appendix, page 42.
Corollary 1. In the most competitive equilibrium, when the buyer fails to take the efficient
level of investment, the equilibrium investment profile is characterized by underinvestment.
The previous two results state that the investment decision of the seller, in the most
competitive equilibrium, is constrained efficient. For a given investment of the common buyer,
the seller always takes the efficient investment decision. However, when the buyer fails to make
the efficient investment decision, the equilibrium investment profile is characterized by the
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“hold-up” problem, and both parties underinvest. Downward distortions of investment arise
because of strategic complementarity, a lower investment of the buyer creates lower potential
gains from trade, and this makes also the investing seller to lower the level of investment. In
the figure below, we compare this equilibrium investment profile from the efficient one. The
line in red represents the region where inefficiencies occur.
KHC KE
KE :
(
1, σ1E
)
HC :
(
0, σ0E
)(1, σ1E) (0, σ0E)
Figure 4: Equilibrium investment profile when the equilibrium outcome is the most competitive.
In the horizontal line there is the fixed cost of investment of the buyer and KHC ,KE stand for the
investing thresholds for the most competitive equilibrium and efficiency respectively. Full efficiency is
implemented whenever K /∈ (KHC ,KE).
We proceed to study what are the characteristics of the investment when the equilib-
rium outcome is less competitive i.e. when the number of sellers coordinating their out of
equilibrium offers is lower, i.e. |Ji| < N \{i}. The result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. When the equilibrium outcome is not the most competitive, i.e. |J | < N − 1,
we obtain that:
i) for a given investment of the buyer, the magnitude of seller’s over-investment depends on
the level of ex-post competition and the degree of the “allocative externality” dx∗m/dσ, and this
is equal to
γ(J) = −
∑
m 6∈J,1
(∫ X∗−{J,1}+∑j∈J x˜j(J)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
)
dx∗m
dσ
.
Over-investment decreases with the level of “intensive” competition, ∂γ(J)/∂J < 0.
ii) When the buyer’s investment decision is not efficient, this is characterized by underin-
vestment, and for a given investment of the seller, the region of costs below which the buyer
invests increases with the competitiveness of the equilibrium outcome, ∂KJ(σ¯)/∂J > 0.
Again the formal proof is in the appendix, page 43. Contrary to the case where competition
is the most severe, the investment of the seller is distorted upwards. This is due to the fact
that he does not only appropriate all the direct gains coming from his investment, but also
part of the payoffs from the other sellers.
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For a fixed investment of the buyer, the magnitude of over-investment γ(J) decreases
with J . In other words, the lower is the level of competition - which implies a smaller J - the
distortion of investment will be larger. With the same investment of the buyer, the investment
of the seller is monotonically decreasing with the level of competition. Additionally, the
amount of over-investment depends on how the equilibrium allocation of the non investing
sellers changes with respect to the investment of the former. The larger is this “allocative
externality” the more the seller over-invests. This is because the “loss” of exclusion depends
on his investment profile through the allocation of the out of equilibrium offers that remains
unchanged for the sellers who do not coordinate their offers. The larger the investment of the
seller the more costly it will be to exclude him, and he consequently obtains a larger transfer
at the expense of the other sellers.
Regarding the investment threshold of the buyer, she decides to invest if the fixed cost of
production are lower than the following threshold
K(J) ≡ TS∗(1, σ1(J))− TS∗ (0, σ0(J))−∑
i∈N
(
T 1(J)− T 0(J)) .
It is easy to see that, whenever the seller’s investment remains unchanged, this threshold
is increasing with the level of competition. Higher competition entails a larger partition of
the trading surplus that goes to the buyer and she has larger incentives to invest. However, in
equilibrium the investment threshold of the buyer also depend on the investment undertaken
by the seller, and due to investment complementarity, this will be positively affected by lower
levels of competition. The change of this threshold with regards to the level of “intensive”
competition is given by
d [K(J)]
dJ
=
∂k
∂J︸︷︷︸
+
+
∂K(J)
∂σ
× ∂σ
∂J︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
,
whose final sign depends on how the investment of the seller is affected by competition, and
this is represented by (∂γ(J)/∂J).
With regards to the equilibrium investment profile, we introduce the following corollary.
Now, ex-ante inefficiencies may arise to both sides of the market.
Corollary 2. Whenever the buyer takes the efficient investment decisions the seller over-
invests.
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i) If the investment decision of the buyer is not efficient, the inefficiency created is two-sided:
A) the buyers underinvests, and
B) the seller over-invests or underinvest depending on how investment affects the efficient
allocation of the non investing sellers. Over-investment always appears in equilibrium if the
“allocative externality” is sufficiently big, i.e.
−dx
∗
m
dσ
>
∫ x∗1(0,σ0E)
x∗1(1,σ
1
E)
C ′′xσ(τ)dτ
(N \ {1} − J)× ∫ X∗−{J,m}(0,σ0J)+∑j∈J x˜j(0,σ0J |J)
X∗(0,σ0J)
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
= λ(J).
The formal proof is the appendix, page 45, and the figure below represents the equilibrium
investment decisions and its differences from the efficient one. One red line represents a
situation where inefficiency occurs to only one side of the market, and two lines represents
inefficiencies arising to both sides.
KJ KE
K
(
1, σ1J
)
σJ > σE
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)
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σJ > σE
Figure 5: Equilibrium investment profile when the competition ex-post is not the most competitive.
In the horizontal line, there is the fixed cost of investment for the buyer and KJ ,KE stand for the
investing thresholds in equilibrium and efficiency respectively. Full efficiency is never implemented and
it can be double-sided when the fixed cost of investment of the buyer is in K ∈ (KJ ,KE).
In order to give some clarity of the results, we proceed to represent graphically the equilib-
rium investment profile depending on the degree of “intensive” competition. On the upper part
of the figure 6, picture a) and b) we represent the equilibrium investment of the seller and this
crucially depends on the level of competition ex-post and the degree of the “allocative exter-
nality” that he creates to the other sellers. This does not only determines the slope of the curve
represented in the figure, but also the investment decision of the buyer. We see that whether
the investment threshold of the buyer is monotone or not, depends on this “allocative external-
ity”. In general, when the effect that the investing seller has on the equilibrium amount traded
of the other sellers is small, a more unfavorable partition of the surplus, coming from a lower
competitive outcome, dominates the constraining effect that the investing seller creates on
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Figure 6: Equilibrium investment profile of the seller and the buyer depending on the level of ex-post
competition. The fixed investment cost of the buyer is represented by the red line in pictures c) and
d). The left represents a situation with a moderate “allocative externality”, and on the right this is
large.
the equilibrium transfers of the others d [K(J)] /dJ > 0 → |∂k/∂J | > |∂K(J)/∂σ × ∂σ/∂J |.
In this case, the investment threshold of the buyer is monotonically decreasing with lower
competitive outcome as it is stated in proposition 3, and represented in picture c). As a
result, a lower level of competition entails that the buyer mat decide to switch his investment
decision from investment to non-investment, which generates the jump downwards on the
investment of the seller as represented in a). Conversely, whenever the “allocative external-
ity” is large, the constraint created to the transfers of the non-investing sellers dominates the
more unfavorable partition of the trading surplus. Here, lower competition makes the buyer
to undertake a positive level of investment, that will not come about with higher levels of
competition. This is represented in picture d), where for low levels of competition the buyer
decides to invest.
So far we have established how the competitiveness of the outcome in the trading game
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affects the investment decisions of both sides of the market. We now proceed to study how the
equilibrium investment profile is affected by the “extensive” degree of competition, in order
words, on the number of active sellers in the industry.
5.3.4 “Extensive” competition
In this section, we study how the equilibrium investment profile depends on the number of
active sellers in the economy. “Ceteris paribus”, the larger the number of sellers, the lowers are
the cost of exclusion, and hence the lower the transfer that each seller obtains in equilibrium.
The trading amount of the excluded seller can be easily substituted by trading more with
the rest, and the higher their number, the smaller is the “loss” of trade caused by exclusion.
Unsurprisingly, this has an effect on the equilibrium investment profile and the result is stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Regardless of the level of ex-post competition, full efficiency is implemented
provided that the number of active sellers is “sufficiently” large.
The derivation is in the appendix, page 46, and this comes from the fact that, as the
number of sellers increases, each seller is able to appropriate less from the trading surplus, as
the “loss” of exclusion decreases with the number of active sellers. When the number of sellers
is large, each seller is only able to appropriate his marginal contribution of the trading surplus
regardless of the equilibrium outcome. The buyer also invests efficiently, with a larger number
of active sellers, each one of them appropriates less from the trading gains generated by the
investment of the buyer, and she invests efficiently no matter the fixed costs of investment.
The link between unilateral investment decisions and the number of active sellers is illustrated
in the figure 7.
The picture illustrates that with one active seller, we have a situation of a bilateral
monopoly. Because we consider a game where the seller has the whole bargaining power,
the buyer is completely “held-up” and she never invests. Conversely, the investment decision
of the seller is the efficient one. With more than one seller, we have a situation where the
buyer decides to invests, this is because sellers start to compete for the trading contracts and
the former is able to appropriate part of the benefits coming from his investment. With low
levels of competition, the seller over-invests as he gets more than his marginal contribution to
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Figure 7: Unilateral investment decisions as a function of number of active sellers. On the left,
the investment of the seller and on the right, the threshold below which the buyer decides to invest.
The thick solid line stands for the efficient investment profile, the solid line represents a situation
where competition is the most severe. The dashed line is the one corresponding to the lowest level of
competition.
the surplus. However, since competition increases with a larger number of sellers, in the limit,
each seller is only able to obtain his marginal contribution of the trading surplus. Regardless
of the equilibrium in the trading game, the buyer is able to get all the benefits coming for her
investment with a sufficiently large number of sellers.
With the link between investment and competition, we proceed to undertake equilibrium
comparison. We start by introducing the concept of Pareto optimality and we indicate which
equilibrium is the one preferred by the parties offering the trading contracts. Later, we depart
from the analysis of surplus distribution, and we establish which equilibrium performs best
in terms of welfare.
6 Comparison of equilibria
We see that both the concept of Pareto dominance and equilibrium ranking in terms of welfare
crucially depend on how competitive the outcome in the trading game is. Moreover, we see
that the magnitude of the “allocative externality” that the investing seller creates to the rest
of the sellers is of the utmost importance.
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6.1 Pareto optimality
In this section, we analyze which equilibrium gives higher payoffs to the side of the market
offering the trading contracts. It is obvious that with a given investment profile, the offering
parties always prefer a situation where the outcome is less competitive. When the trading
surplus remains unchanged, the sellers prefer a setting where the distribution of the surplus
is more favorable to them.18 However, since in our model the equilibrium investment profile
depends on the level of competition ex-post, low equilibrium outcomes may not always be
preferred. For the investing seller, the trade-off is whether a more favorable distribution has
an effect on the investing decision of the buyer. For the non-investing sellers, in addition, there
is also the investment decision of the seller and how this affects their equilibrium allocation.
The result is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Whenever the “allocative externality” is “small” such that ∂KJ/∂J > 0 :
i) the least competitive equilibrium is Pareto dominant for the sellers if the investment decision
of the buyer is equilibrium invariant,
ii) otherwise, Pareto dominance is attained with an intermediate level of competition.
Whenever the “allocative externality” is “big” such that ∂KJ/∂J < 0, the least competitive
equilibrium is never Pareto dominant,
i) while it is always preferred for the investing seller,
ii) the non-investing sellers are always better-off with the most competitive equilibrium.
The formal proof is relegated to the appendix, page 48, and we see that this result comes
at no surprise. For convenience we have defined the “allocative externality” of being either
“big” or “small” depending on whether the investment threshold of the buyer either increases
or decreases with regards to the level of ex-post competition. In figure 8 and 9, we give a
graphical interpretation of the result stated in the proposition. While figure 8 represents a
situation where the “allocative externality” is small, figure 9 stands for the opposite case.
Because in equilibrium the investment of one party is affected by the other one, and those
are strategic complements, we are sure that the investing seller and the buyer are always
18This is the case in Chiesa & Denicolo` (2009, 2012). They state that the minimum rent equilibrium - the
least competitive equilibrium - is Pareto dominant. This result comes from the fact that as long as parties do
not invest, the potential trading surplus stays the same, all the sellers are identical and an equilibrium of the
trading game represents only a split of the surplus.
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Figure 8: Payoffs of the sellers as a function of the level of ex-post competition. It depicts a situation
where the “allocative externality” is small. The black line represents the payoff of the investing seller
and the dashed line is the one for the non-investing sellers. The picture on the left stands for a situation
where the equilibrium investment of the buyer is equilibrium invariant.
better-off the higher the investments in equilibrium. However, this is not always the case
for the non investing sellers where the investment of the buyer and the seller go in opposite
directions. The seller who is investing obtains a higher payoff as the investment is superior in
a less competitive equilibrium when the investment of the buyer is equilibrium invariant. For
the non-investing sellers, they will prefer a division of the surplus that is more favorable as
long as the investment of the seller is not very different in all possible equilibria. As we have
seen, an increase in the level of investment by the seller creates an “allocative externality” to
the other sellers as they trade less with the common buyer. This negative externality then
dominates a more favorable partition of the surplus when the difference of investments of the
seller is large.
Therefore, Pareto dominance of a less competitive equilibrium is not robust when we
introduce specific investment by the trading partners. The intuition behind this result is
that under some situations and because both parts of the market are undertaking specific
investment, it might be better to agree to a even distribution of the potential gains from
trade between all parties than a more asymmetric one, since the latter might induce one of
the parties to withdraw from investment.
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Figure 9: Payoffs of the sellers as a function of the level of ex-post competition. It represents a
situation where the “allocative externality” is large. The black line depicts the payoff of the investing
seller and the dashed line is the one for the non-investing sellers. The picture on the left stands for a
situation where the equilibrium investment of the buyer is equilibrium invariant.
6.2 Welfare
Here, we rank equilibria according to the welfare obtained, and this equals the total gains
generated from trade minus the costs of investment
W ∗(b, σ) = TS∗(b, σ)−K × b− ψ(σ).
From the previous analysis we have seen that ex-ante inefficiencies are more prompt to
emerge whenever the ex-post competition is less severe. Hence, the most competitive equi-
librium, in general, performs better in terms of welfare. However, we have also established
that investments in our setting are strategic complements. Therefore, under some parameters,
we find that decreasing the level of ex-post competition may entail larger welfare whenever
the “allocative externality” created to the non-investing sellers is sufficiency big. Hence, the
inefficiencies in investment, arising to the side of the seller, might work as a mechanism to re-
store the efficient investment of the buyer. As long as this latter investment has an important
contribution to the trading surplus, this is welfare enhancing. The following theorem states
this result.
Theorem 1. When in the most competitive equilibrium, the investment decision of the buyer
is not efficient and the “allocative externality” is sufficiently “big”, welfare is maximized with
an intermediate level of competition. Otherwise, the maximum welfare is always attained with
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the highest level of competition.
The formal proof of the theorem is in the appendix, page 50 and the graphical interpreta-
tion of the result is in figure 10. We see that welfare is monotonically increasing with the level
of competition ex-post in situations where the investment decision of the buyer is equilibrium
invariant. The figure presents jumps whenever the investment decision of the buyer depends
on the competitiveness of the equilibrium outcome. In this case, we find that welfare is max-
imized with an intermediate level of competition if the decision of the buyer switches from
non-investing to investing when the equilibrium outcome is less competitive. In the situation
when the buyer is taking the efficient investment decision in the most competitive equilibrium,
any change of the investment of the buyer translates to a lower level of welfare.
Figure 10: Welfare as a function of the level of competition. The figure on the right stands for
the situation where the investment of the buyer in the higher level of competition coincides with the
efficient one, and the figure on the left is when the contrary occurs. Jumps in the curves stand for a
switch in the investing decision of the buyer and a higher slope of the curves represented larger levels
of the “allocative externality”.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have seen that by introducing competition to the side of the market who
has the whole bargaining power, the “hold-up” problem can be solved without the existence
of ex-ante contracts. Hence, organizing the economic activity to a certain way can circumvent
situations were economic institutions do not allow for designing or enforcing ex-ante contracts.
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Full ex-ante efficiency can only be achieved when the outcome of the trading game is the most
competitive. In this case, sellers coordinate their out of equilibrium offers in order to minimize
the “loss” arising when a seller is excluded from trade. Here, each seller appropriates his
marginal contribution to the trading surplus which gives the incentives to invest efficiently.
Moreover, with the introduction of specific investment to both sides of the market, the
equilibrium played in the trading game is not only a way to redistribute rents between the
sellers and the buyer, but it has also an effect on the size of the potential gains from trade. In
previous analysis, it has been stated that an equilibrium where the competition is maximal is
not necessarily very attractive from the part of the market offering the trading contracts. This
is because the offering part can “tacitly” coordinate to reduce competition in order to obtain
a more favorable partition of the potential gains from trade. However, in the current work we
have seen that, in general, an equilibrium with higher competition displays a more efficient
investment profile which implies a larger surplus. Yet, we obtained that if the efficient trading
allocation is very sensitive to the investment of the seller, lower levels of ex-post competition,
might perform better than higher competition in terms of welfare. This is possible in our
model due to the fact that specific investment is undertaken by both sides of the market and
they are strategic complements. We have shown that with a large “allocative externality”
the investing seller invests more and the “loss” of exclusion of the remaining sellers might be
smaller. As a result, the common buyer decides to invest in a lower competitive equilibrium
bringing about a larger welfare.
Therefore, one question that deserves attention is what equilibrium is more likely to arise.
This issue has already been addressed in the literature but there does not exist a clear an-
swer.19 Yet, in our model this is a question of great importance due to its affects on welfare.
Despite the fact that we can not be sure of the equilibrium played in the trading game, we
think that an external player might induce some set of equilibria to be played. This might
be the case in markets that has been recently liberalized, where an external player, in order
to maximize welfare, has to ensure that real competition exists in the market. In our model,
inducing a particular type of equilibrium has to do with the number of sellers who coordinate
their out of equilibrium transfers. Hence, and a third party might be able to induce one
19Some of the works addressing equilibrium selection are Martimort & Stole (2009) and Klemperer & Meyer
(1989).
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equilibrium or another by imposing restrictions on the number of contracts submitted or on
putting obstacles to coordination.
It is also important to see if the present results go trough if we relax some of our as-
sumptions. In the model, we considered the case that only one of the sellers knows the new
technology and can undertake specific investment to reduce the cost of production. A natural
extension of the model is to consider the case where all sellers have knowledge of a technology
to reduce the production costs. However, even if unilateral investment decisions are easy to
obtain and coincide with the ones obtained in this paper, the characterization of the equi-
librium investment profile seems daunting. This is so because the investment of the buyer
between the sellers are strategic complements, while the ones among sellers are strategic sub-
stitutes. However, we suspect that the strategic substitutability among sellers’ investment is
of second order. Hence, an increase in the investment of the buyer makes all sellers to invest
more in equilibrium.
Another extension is to consider a setting without a monopolistic buyer. In this case,
non-exclusivity also comes from the fact that a seller can sign multiple trading contracts with
different buyers. In such a case, a buyer differentiates and creates an indirect externality
to the others if she decides to invest. We believe that the equilibrium menus offered are
complicated to obtain, and we conjecture that the competitive advantage that the buyer gets
with respect to the rest might induce him to over-invest.
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A Appendix
Lemma 3. The total gains from trade are bigger when the buyer invests, that is, TS∗(1, σ1) >
TS∗(0, σ0).
Proof. This is easy to see because:
TS∗(1, σ1) = U(X∗(1, σ1) | b = 1)− C(x∗1(1, σ1) | σ1)−
∑
i 6=1
C(x∗i (1, σ
1))
> U(X∗(1, σ0) | b = 1)− C(x∗1(1, σ1) | σ1)−
∑
i 6=1
C(x∗i (1, σ
1))
= U(X∗(1, σ0) | b = 1)− U(X∗(1, σ0)) + U(X∗(1, σ0))− C(x∗1(1, σ1) | σ1)−
∑
i6=1
C(x∗i (1, σ
1))
≥ U(X∗(1, σ0) | b = 1)− U(X∗(1, σ0)) + TS∗(0, σ0)
=⇒ TS∗(1, σ1)− TS∗(0, σ0) ≥ U(X∗(1, σ0) | b = 1)− U(X∗(1, σ0)) > 0.
The first inequality comes from efficiency and the last inequality comes by assumption U(X∗ | b =
1)− U(X∗) > 0 ∀X.
Lemma 4. The total gains from trade are is bigger with a higher investment of the seller, TS∗(b, σ′) >
TS∗(b, σ) for σ′ > σ.
Proof. We consider the case where b = 0 but the case where b = 1 is analogous.
TS∗(0, σ) = U(X∗(0, σ))− C(x∗1(0, σ) | σ)−
∑
i 6=1
C(x∗i (0, σ))
< U(X∗(0, σ))− C(x∗1(0, σ) | σ′)−
∑
i 6=1
C(x∗i (0, σ)) + U(X
∗(0, σ′))− U(X∗(0, σ′))
< U(X∗(0, σ))− U(X∗(0, σ′)) + TS∗(0, σ′)
=⇒ TS∗(0, σ′)− TS∗(0, σ) ≥ U(X∗(0, σ′))− U(X∗(0, σ)) =
∫ X∗(0,σ′)
X∗(0,σ)
U ′x(τ)dτ > 0,
where the strict inequality comes from lemma 1 that X∗(0, σ′) > X∗(0, σ) for any σ′ > σ.
Lemma 5. The increase on the total gains from trade by an extra seller are higher when the buyer is
investing:
TS∗(1, σ1)− TS∗−i(1, σ1) ≥ TS∗(0, σ0)− TS∗−i(0, σ0) for i 6= 1.
Proof. We will make explicit use of lemma 3. Observe that the previous expression is equivalent to
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TS∗(1, σ1)− TS∗(0, σ0) ≥ TS∗−i(1, σ1)− TS∗−i(0, σ0) and by lemma 3 we know that
TS∗(1, σ1)− TS∗(0, σ0) ≥ U(X∗(1, σ1) | b = 1)− U(X∗(1, σ1)) = D.
We proceed by obtaining the upper bound of the difference TS∗−i(1, σ
1)− TS∗−i(0, σ0):
TS∗−i(1, σ
1) = U
∑
j 6=1
x˜j(1, σ
1 | J¯) | b = 1
− C (x˜1(1, σ1 | J¯) | σ1)− ∑
j 6=i,1
C
(
x˜j(1, σ
1 | J¯))
≤ U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯) | 1
− C (x˜1(1, σ0 | J¯) | σ0)− ∑
j 6=i,1
C
(
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯))
= U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯) | b = 1
− U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯)
+ U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯)

− C (x˜1(1, σ0 | J¯) | σ0)− ∑
j 6=i,1
C
(
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯))
≤ U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯) | b = 1
− U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯)
+ TS∗−i(0, σ0)
=⇒ TS∗−i(1, σ1)− TS∗−i(0, σ0) ≤ U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯) | b = 1
− U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯)
 = D.
Where the first two inequalities come from efficiency and it is easy to see that D −D > 0 as
D −D = U(X∗(1, σ0) | b = 1)− U(X∗(1, σ0))−
U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯) | b = 1
− U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯)

= U(X∗(1, σ0) | b = 1)− U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯) | b = 1
−
U(X∗(1, σ0))− U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(1, σ
0 | J¯)

=
∫ X∗(1,σ0)
∑
j 6=i x˜j(1,σ0|J¯)
(U ′x(τ | b = 1)− U ′x(τ)) dτ > 0,
which is positive by lemma 2 and assumption U ′x(τ | b = 1) > U ′x(τ).
Lemma 6. The increase on the total welfare given by an extra seller is higher when the buyer is
investing,
TS∗(1, σ1)− TS∗−1(1)− ψ(σ1) ≥ TS∗(0, σ0)− TS∗−1(0)− ψ(σ0).
Proof. We are going to proceed by contradiction. Take that the net profit of the seller when the agent
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invest is strictly lower than when he does not invest.
TS∗(1, σ1)− TS∗−1(1)− ψ(σ1) < TS∗(0, σ0)− TS∗−1(0)− ψ(σ0),
and by the optimality of the investment decision of the seller we have shown that σ1 > σ0 but then
the seller could reduce the amount of investment when the agent invest and set σ1 = σ0 but the we
have that ψ(σ1) = ψ(σ0) and the previous expression is
TS∗(1, σ0)− TS∗−1(1) < TS∗(0, σ0)− TS∗−1(0),
but this contradicts what we have proven in lemma 5.
Lemma 7. The difference obtained in the gains from trade from collective replacement to any other
replacement undertaken by J < N − 1 is higher if the buyer is investing.
TS∗−1(1)− T˜ S−1(1, σ1J | J) > TS∗−1(0)− T˜ S−1(0, σ0J | J).
Proof. By using the same procedure as in lemma 5 we obtain:
TS∗−1(1)− T˜ S−1(1, σ1J | J)− TS∗−1(0) + T˜ S−1(0, σ0J | J)
≥ U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(J¯) | b = 1
− U
X∗−{J,1} +∑
j∈J
x˜j(J) | b = 1
−
U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(J¯)
− U
X∗−{J,1} +∑
j∈J
x˜1(J)

=
∫ ∑
j 6=1 x˜j(J¯)
X∗−{J,1}+
∑
j∈J x˜1(J)
(U ′x(τ | b = 1)− U ′x(τ)) dτ > 0,
and this is positive by lemma 2 and by assumption U(X | b = 1) > U(X). Also by the facts that the
investment of the seller makes the difference to increase.
Lemma 8. When the buyer invests in J ′ but not in J when J ′ ⊂ J , the non-investing seller is always
better in the most competitive equilibrium. For any J ′ ⊂ J then:
TS∗(0, σ0J )− T˜ S−i(0, σ0J | J) > TS∗(1, σ1J’)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1J’ | J ′).
Proof. We proceed by contradiction, consider the case that
TS∗(0, σ0J)− T˜ S−i(0, σ0J | J) < TS∗(1, σ1J’)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1J’ | J ′),
but then as it has been shown before, it cannot be the case that KJ′ > KJ , since in this case
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replacement by a lower number of sellers is more expensive and then it cannot be that with J ′ then
b = 1 and at the same time that for J then b = 0. Then, we reach a contradiction. Finally, by the
monotonicity of the investment of the seller we obtain that the maximum payoff for the non investing
sellers is in the highest competitive equilibrium which is given by: TS∗(0, σ0HC)− TS∗−i(0, σ0HC).
B Appendix
Proof of lemma 1: We start by proving how seller’s investment affects the equilibrium allocation.
We consider the case where b = 0 but this is analogous for b = 1. Differentiating the first-order
conditions given in (5.1) for x∗j with respect to σ we obtain
U ′′xx(X
∗)×
N∑
h=1
dx∗h
dσ
= C ′′xx(x
∗
j )×
dx∗j
dσ
. (B.1)
Since the left hand side is independent of j we find that all dx∗j/dσ have the same sign. Now
suppose also dx∗1/dσ has that same sign. Then also the sum has that same sign and since U
′′
xx(·) < 0
and C ′′xx(·) > 0 this leads to a contradiction. Now suppose dx∗1/dσ < 0. The other signs therefore have
to be positive. By (B.1) we find
∑N
h=1 dx
∗
h/dσ < 0. But the first-order condition for x
∗
1, differentiated
with respect to σ is
U ′′xx(X
∗)×
N∑
h=1
dx∗h
dσ
= C ′′xx(x
∗
1 | σ)×
dx∗1
dσ
+ C ′′xσ(x
∗
1 | σ), (B.2)
which would then have a positive left hand side and a negative right hand side due to C ′′xσ(·) < 0 - a
contradiction.
We thus have shown the second and third point. Again by (B.1) the first claim follows from
∂X∗/∂σ =
∑N
h=1 dx
∗
h/dσ and the level of the “allocative sensitivity” is implicitly characterized in
expression (B.1).We proceed by analyzing the effect that the investment of the buyer has on the
equilibrium allocation. Again, we are going to make use of the conditions for the equilibrium allocation
represented in equation (5.1), and for a fixed investment of the seller we get
C ′x(x
∗
1 | σ) = U ′x(X∗ | b = 1) > U ′x(X∗) = C ′x(x∗1 | σ) for 1,
C ′x(x
∗
i ) = U
′
x(X
∗ | b = 1) > U ′x(X∗) = C ′x(x∗i ) for i 6= 1.
The strict inequality is by assumption and by the convexity of the cost function we obtain the
result.
39
Proof of lemma 2: We are going to consider the case where b = 0 but this is similar for b = 1. Also,
consider any J ⊂ N . Whenever the investment profile is the same, we know that∑h6=Ji,i x∗h = X∗−{Ji,i},
and the expression above is equivalent to
∑
j∈Ji x
∗
j + x
∗
i >
∑
j∈Ji x˜j(Ji). Therefore since x
∗
i > 0 if∑
j∈Ji
(
x∗j − x˜j(Ji)
)
> 0 we are done. Observe that for a given investment profile, if the above it is
true, it has to be true for any j ∈ Ji, hence x∗j > x˜j(Ji). If the contrary occurs, x∗j < x˜j(Ji), then
from the equilibrium allocation we have
U ′x
X∗−{Ji,i} + ∑
j∈Ji
x˜j(Ji)
 = C ′x(x˜j(Ji)) > C ′x(x∗j ) = U ′x(X∗),
and by concavity of U we prove the claim. The previous also implies that for any j ∈ Ji we have
x˜j(Ji) > x
∗
j . Using the same procedure we can easily prove that for any J ⊆ J ′ we have:
X∗−{J′i,i} +
∑
j∈J′i
x˜j(J
′
i) ≥ X∗−{Ji,i} +
∑
j∈Ji
x˜j(Ji),
and by using the same argument as before, we obtain that x˜j(Ji) ≥ x˜j(J ′i).
Proof of proposition 1: The equilibrium transfer for seller 1 depend on the set J1 and for a
given investment profile this is equal to
T1(J1) = U (X
∗ | b)−
 max
{xj}j∈J1
U
X∗−{J1,1} + ∑
j∈J1
xj | x˜1 = 0, b
−∑
j∈J1
C(xj)
+ ∑
j∈J1
C(x∗j )
 .
Operating we obtain
T1(J1) = U(X
∗ | b)−
∑
j∈J1
C(x∗j )−
U
X∗−{J1,1} + ∑
j∈J1
x˜j(J1) | x˜1 = 0, b
−∑
j∈J
C(x˜j(J1))

= U(X∗ | b)−
∑
j∈J1
C(x∗j )−
U
X∗−{J1,1} + ∑
j∈J1
x˜j(J1) | x˜1 = 0, b
−∑
j∈J1
C(x˜j(J1))

+
 ∑
j 6∈J1,1
(
C(x∗j )− C(x∗j )
)+ [C(x∗1 | σ)− C(x∗1 | σ)]
= TS∗(b, σ)−
U
X∗−{J1,1} + ∑
j∈J1
x˜j(J1) | x˜1 = 0, b
−∑
j∈J1
C(x˜j(J1))−
∑
j 6=J1,1
C(x∗j )
+ C(x∗1 | σ)
= TS∗(b, σ)− T˜ S−i(b | J1) + C(x∗1 | σ).
By putting this to the payoff functions in (4.1) and (4.3), we show point (i) of the proposition by
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obtaining the equilibrium payoffs obtain the equilibrium payoffs of all the players.
We proceed to show point (ii). It states that for a given investment profile (b, σ) each sellers obtains
more than his marginal contribution when they coordinate on reducing competition ex-post. This is
equivalent to show that TS∗−i(b, σ) > T˜S−i(b, σ | Ji). We consider the case where b = 0 but b = 1 is
similar, and we take the equilibrium transfer for the investing seller.
T˜ S−1(0 | J) = U
X∗−{J1,1} + ∑
j∈J1
x˜j(J1)
−∑
j∈J1
C(x˜j(J1))−
∑
j 6=J1,1
C(x∗j )
= U
X∗−{J1,1} +∑
j∈J
x˜j(J1)
−∑
j∈J1
C(x˜j(J1))−
∑
j 6=J,1
C(x∗j )
+
U
∑
j 6=1
x˜j(J¯)
− U
∑
j 6=1
x˜j(J¯)

≤ U
X∗−{J1,1} + ∑
j∈J1
x˜j(J1)
− U
∑
j 6=i
x˜j(J¯)
+ TS∗−1(b)
=⇒ TS∗−1(b)− T˜ S−1(b | J1) ≥ U
∑
j 6=1
x˜j(J¯)
− U
X∗−{J1,1} + ∑
j∈J1
x˜j(J1)

=
∫ ∑
j 6=1 x˜j(J¯)
X∗−{J1,1}+
∑
j∈J1 x˜j(J1)
U ′x(τ)dτ > 0,
where the last inequality comes from lemma 2, and this can be applied for any seller i. From the
above, it is also true for any i that for any J ′ ⊃ J we obtain that T˜ S−i(b, σ | Ji) < T˜S−i(b, σ | J ′i).
Proof of proposition 2: As it will be clear later, depending on the fixed cost parameter the
buyer undertakes the efficient investment. Therefore, in order to show existence of efficiency in the
equilibrium investment profile, we pay attention to seller’s investment. We first show the “if” part of
the proposition. The payoff of the seller in the most competitive equilibrium is
piHC1 = TS
∗(b, σ)− TS∗−1(b),
and the term TS∗−1(b) does not depend on the amount invested σ. Therefore using TS
∗(b, σ) given by
expression (4.4) and by the envelope-theorem, the first-order condition for the seller 1 is given by
ψ′σ(σHC) = −C ′σ
(
x∗1(b, σ
b
HC)|σbHC
)
, (B.3)
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and this coincides with the efficient one obtained in expression (5.8). Because the seller receives the
full marginal social surplus from his own investment, he becomes the residual claimant and invests
efficiently. Therefore, whenever the investment decision of the buyer coincides with the efficient one
i.e. bHC = bE the equilibrium vector in the most competitive equilibrium is efficient.
To show the “only if” part, we take any J ⊂ N and J 6= N \ {1}, and we obtain that the equilibrium
payoffs of seller 1 is
pi1(b, σ | J1) = TS∗(b, σ)− T˜ S−1(b, σ | J1),
and calculating the first order condition and applying the envelope theorem we obtain that the equi-
librium investment profile is characterized by
ψ′σ(σ) = −C ′σ(x∗1(b, σb)|σb)−
∂
(
T˜ S−1(b, σ | J1)
)
∂σ
,
where the extra term depends on the investment of the seller from the allocation that remains un-
changed X∗−{J,1}(b, σ). As a result, ∂
(
T˜ S−1(b, σ | J1)
)
/∂σ 6= 0 and this creates a distortion of the
investment of the seller. Hence, we conclude that full efficiency is only implemented whenever the
competition between sellers is the most severe.
Proof of corollary 1: The investment decision of the seller is the one in proposition (2) and the
one for the buyer in the most competitive equilibrium is
K
≤ TS
∗(1, σ1E)− TS∗(0, σ0E)− κHC ≡ KHC then b = 1
> KHC then b = 0
, (B.4)
where the term κHC is the difference in the payoff of the sellers when the buyer decides to invest and
it is equal to
κHC ≡ piHC1 (1, σ1E)− piHC1 (0, σ0E) +
∑
i 6=1
[
piHCi (1, σ
1
E))− piHCi (0, σ0E))
]
= TS∗(1, σ1)− TS∗−1(1)− TS∗(0, σ0) + TS∗−1(0)
+
∑
i 6=1
[
TS∗(1, σ1)− TS∗−i(1, σ1)− TS∗(0, σ0) + TS∗−i(0, σ0)
]
.
The magnitude κHC then represents how much the sellers benefit from the investment of the
buyer and are the gains that cannot be appropriated by the latter. By making an explicit use of
the lemmas in appendix A we show that the appropriation of the gains by the sellers is bigger than
the cost of investment κHC > ψ(σ
1
E) − ψ(σ0E). We show that κ > ψ(σ1E) − ψ(σ0E) by splitting κ in
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two parts A =
∑
i 6=1
[
TS∗(1, σ1)− TS∗−i(1, σ1)− TS∗(0, σ0) + TS∗−i(0, σ0)
]
and B = TS∗(1, σ1) −
TS∗−1(1) − TS∗(0, σ0) + TS∗−1(0). In lemma 5, we show that A > 0 and in lemma 6 we show that
B > ψ(σ1E)− ψ(σ0E).
This implies that the threshold of the cost of the buyer below which she invests is lower compared
to the efficient one KHC < KE. Thus, as the buyer cannot appropriate all the gains coming from his
investment she underinvests whenever the fix cost of investment is K ∈ (KHC,KE) as bHC 6= bE = 1.
Finally, since investments are strategic complements, this implies that the seller also underinvests in
equilibrium, i.e. σHC < σE. Hence, as long as the investment of the seller increases the total amount
traded as shown in lemma 1, the threshold for the investment of the buyer also increases with the
investment of the seller. ∂KHC/∂σ = −∂κHC/∂σ > 0. And this coincides with the change of the
payoffs for the buyer.
∂ΠHC(·)
∂σ
= −∂κHC
∂σ
= −
∑
i 6=1
∫ x˜1(1,σ|J¯)+x∗1(0,σ)
x∗1(1,σ)+x˜1(0,σ|J¯)
C ′′xσ(τ)dτ > 0,
and this is positive by x˜1(1, σ | J¯) + x∗1(0, σ) > x∗1(1, σ) + x˜1(0, σ | J¯) and assumption C ′′xσ(·) < 0.
Proof of proposition 3: We start by showing point (i). From proposition 2 we know that the
seller’s investment fails to be efficient. Here, we show that there exist over-investment and we give it’s
magnitude. We take the first order condition for the seller. Then, from the equilibrium payoff of the
seller 1 and the envelope condition, we obtain that for any Ji < N \ {i}
ψ′σ(σJ) = −C ′σ(x∗1(b, σJ) | σJ)−
∑
m 6=J,1
U ′x
X∗−{J,1} +∑
j∈J
x˜j(J)
− C ′x(x∗j )
× dx∗m
dσ
= −C ′σ(x∗1(b, σJ) | σJ)−
∑
m 6=J,1
U ′x
X∗−{J,1} +∑
j∈J
x˜j(J)
− U ′x(X∗)
× dx∗m
dσ
,
(B.5)
where the transformation in the second line is due to the fact that, at the equilibrium allocation,
marginal benefit equals marginal cost, i.e. U ′x(X
∗) = C ′x(x
∗
j ), ∀j ∈ N . Comparing this condition with
the efficient one in (5.8), we see that the difference is the additional term is
γ(J) ≡ −
∑
m 6=J,1
U ′x
X∗−{J,1} +∑
j∈J
x˜j(J)
− U ′x(X∗)
× dx∗m
dσ
,
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and by applying the fundamental theorem of calculus we get
γ(J) ≡ −
∑
m 6=J,1
(∫ X∗−{J,1}+∑j∈J x˜j(J)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
)
× dx
∗
m
dσ
> 0,
and the whole expression is positive. By lemma 2 and the concavity of U, we know that the part
in brackets is positive. By lemma 1 we know that the amount traded with the sellers that are not
investing is decreasing with the amount invested by the seller. Therefore, this term is strictly positive
which means that the seller over-invests and it’s magnitude depends on the “allocative sensitivity”
that the investment of the seller creates to the non-investing sellers. In order to show that the degree
of over-investment decreases with the level of competition, i.e. ∂γ(J)/∂J < 0, we calculate how the
previous expression varies with an increase in J . By applying Leibniz rule we obtain
∂γ(J)
∂J
=
(∫ X∗−{J,1}+∑j∈J x˜j(J)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
)
× dx
∗
m
dσ
− U ′′xx
X∗−{J,1} +∑
j∈J
x˜j(J)
× ∂
(
X∗−{J,1} +
∑
j∈J x˜j(J)
)
∂J︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
×dx
∗
m
dσ
< 0,
(B.6)
and the sign is due to lemma 2.
Again point (ii) is more involved and the investment decision of the buyer is given by:
K
≤ TS
∗(1, σ1J)− TS∗(0, σ0J)− κJ ≡ KJ then b = 1
> KJ then b = 0,
(B.7)
where the extra term κJ is the difference in the payoff of the sellers when the buyer invests. Again
this represents how much the sellers benefit from the investment of the buyer and those benefits can
not be appropriate by the latter.
κJ ≡ pi1
(
1, σ1J | J1
)− pi1 (0, σ0J | J1)+∑
i 6=1
[
pii
(
1, σ1J | Ji
)− pii (0, σ0J | Ji)]
= TS∗(1, σ1)− T˜ S−1(1, σ1 | J)− TS∗(0, σ0) + T˜ S−1(0, σ0 | J)
+
∑
i6=1
[
TS∗(1, σ1)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1 | J)− TS∗(0, σ0) + T˜ S−i(0, σ0 | J)
]
.
And for a given investment of the seller, the threshold of the buyer is below the efficient one i.e.
KLC < KE. Again, this comes from the fact that in equilibrium, the buyer is not able to appropriate
all benefits coming from investment and the proof is the same as in corollary 1 and we do not repeat it
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here. Moreover, with a given level of investment by the investing seller, each seller is able to appropriate
a larger amount of the gains from trade as shown in proposition 1, and this reduces the rents of the
buyer. Therefore, the incentives for the buyer to invest decreases the lower the level of competition
ex-post.
Proof of corollary 2: The first point comes directly from proposition 3. Point A states that
whenever the buyer does not take the efficient investment decision, this is characterized by underin-
vestment. We take the extreme case, and this is when the investment ex-post is the least competitive
equilibrium. Hence, we have to show that KLC < KE and hence
KLC ≤ KE ⇐⇒ TS∗(1, σ1LC)− TS∗(0, σ0LC)− κLC ≤ TS∗(1, σ1E)− TS∗(0, σ0E)−
(
ψ
(
σ1E
)− ψ (σ0E))
=⇒ ψ (σ1E)− ψ (σ0E) ≤ TS∗(1, σ1E)− T˜ S−1(1, σ1LC | J)− (TS∗(0, σ0E)− T˜ S−1(0, σ0LC | J))
....................+
∑
i6=1
[
TS∗(1, σ1E)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1LC | J)−
(
TS∗(0, σ0E)− T˜ S−i(0, σ0LC | J)
)]
.
By using the same procedure as in lemma 5 we can see that in general the last part in brackets is
positive. Therefore, to show the above, we need that
TS∗(1, σ1E)− T˜ S−1(1, σ1LC | J)−
(
TS∗(0, σ0E)− T˜ S−1(0, σ0LC | J)
)
≥ ψ (σ1E)− ψ (σ0E) .
Here we apply lemma 7 that states T˜ S−1(1, σ1LC | J) < TS∗−1(1) − TS∗−1(0) + T˜ S−1(0, σ0LC | J),
and by introducing this the the previous expression we have that
TS∗(1, σ1E)− T˜ S−1(1, σ1LC | J)−
(
TS∗(0, σ0E)− T˜ S−1(0, σ0LC | J)
)
> TS∗(1, σ1E)
−
[
TS∗−1(1)− TS∗−1(0) + T˜ S−1(0, σ0LC | J)
]
−
(
TS∗(0, σ0E)− T˜ S−1(0, σ0LC | J)
)
= TS∗(1, σ1E)− TS∗−1(1)−
(
TS∗(0, σ0E)− TS∗−1(0)
)
> ψ
(
σ1E
)− ψ (σ0E) ,
where the last inequality comes by lemma 6. Hence, in general the threshold of investment in the least
competitive equilibrium is lower than the efficiency one.
To show point B we need to compare the right hand side of the expression determining the in-
vestment in the least competitive equilibrium (B.5) evaluated at b = 0, with the right hand side of
expression determining the efficient investment (5.8) evaluated at b = 1.
RhsLC(b = 0) = −C ′σ(x∗1(0, σ0J) | σ)−
∑
m6=J,1
(∫ X∗−{J,1}+∑j∈J x˜j(J)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
)
dx∗m
dσ
.
RhsE(b = 1) = −C ′σ(x∗1(1, σ1E) | σ),
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and we will have that the efficient investment is higher if
RhsE(b = 1) > RhsLC(b = 0)
=⇒ −C ′σ(x∗1(1, σ1) | σ) > −C ′σ(x∗1(0, σ0) | σ)−
∑
m 6=J,1
(∫ X∗−{J,1}+∑j∈J x˜j(J)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
)
dx∗m
dσ
=⇒
∫ x∗1(0,σ0)
x∗1(1,σ1)
C ′′xσ(τ)dτ > −
∑
m6=J,1
(∫ X∗−{J,1}+∑j∈J x˜j(J)
X∗
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
)
dx∗j
dσ
=⇒ −dx
∗
j
dσ
<
∫ x∗1(0,σ0)
x∗1(1,σ1)
C ′′xσ(τ)dτ
(N \ {1} − i)× ∫X∗−{J,1}+∑j∈J x˜j(J)X∗ U ′′xx(τ)dτ ,
otherwise, the contrary occurs. That is, if the allocative sensitivity is large, the investing seller invests
more than the efficiency level regardless of the investment decision of the buyer.
Proof of proposition 4: We proceed by construction and we consider the case when the number
of active sellers tends to infinity. We consider first the investment decision of the seller and take the
case where the distortion is maximal. Hence, if in this situation, investment tends to efficiency, so will
be for any J ⊂ N . Second, we obtain that for any equilibrium, the investment threshold of the buyer
tends to the efficient one.
Regarding the investment of the seller, we take the highest level of distortion and this is the one
when competition ex-post is the least severe, or |J | = 1 = J
γ(N | J) ≡ −
∑
m6=1,i
(∫ X∗−{1,i}(N)+x˜i(N,J)
X∗(N)
U ′′xx(τ)dτ
)
× dx
∗
m
dσ
. (B.8)
Observe that the magnitude of this object depends on the difference between the efficient amount
traded and the one obtained with unilateral replacement which equals to x∗i (N)+x
∗
1(N)−x˜i(N, J) > 0.
We now show that this difference tends to zero when the number of active sellers is arbitrarily large
and so the expression within the brackets in (B.8) tends to zero. At this purpose we make use of the
following two lemmas. The following lemma shows how the individual and aggregate amount of trade
evolves with an increase of sellers.
Lemma 9. For a given investment profile (b, σ) the amount that each seller trades with the buyer
decreases with the number of active sellers, but the aggregate level of trade is higher.
x∗i (∆N) < x
∗
i (N) ∀i ∈ N and X∗(∆N) > X∗(N).
Proof. The results comes directly from the concavity of the utility function and the convexity of the
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cost function. In order to ease notation, we do not consider investment. We define ∆N = N + 1 and
with a number of ∆N active sellers, the amount traded in equilibrium needs to satisfy
U ′x
(
∆N∑
i=1
x∗i (∆N)
)
= C ′x (x
∗
i (∆N)) .
We proof the claim by contradiction, assume that x∗i (∆N) ≥ x∗i (N) ∀ i ∈ N , and since ∆N > N
we have that
∑∆N
i x
∗
i (∆N) >
∑N
i x
∗
i (N) and by the concavity of U(·) and optimality it has to be the
case that
C ′x (x
∗
i (∆N)) = U
′
x
(
∆N∑
i=1
x∗i (∆N)
)
< U ′x
(
N∑
i=1
x∗i (N)
)
= C ′x (x
∗
i (N)) ∀i ∈ N,
but the convexity of C ′x(·) implies that x∗(∆N) < x∗(N), which leads to a contradiction. From the
previous, we see that that X∗(∆N) > X∗(N) comes directly.
Therefore as the number of seller increase, the amount x∗1(N) decreases and limN→∞ x
∗
1(N) ≈ 0.
Regarding how the amount x˜i(N, J) evolves with the number of sellers, we know that this object is
the solution of the function V (X∗−{J,i}) introduced in expression (5.2) in the appendix. The properties
of this function are introduced in the following lemma.
Lemma 10. The function V
(
X∗−{J,i}
)
is well defined, strictly increasing and strictly concave in
X∗−{J,i}. The maximizer x˜i
(
X∗−{J,i}
)
is decreasing in X∗−{J,i}.
Proof. That the function V
(
X∗−{J,i}
)
is well defined follows from the Inada conditions. By the envelop
theorem we have V ′x
(
X∗−{J,i}
)
> 0 and V ′′xx
(
X∗−{J,i}
)
< 0, which implies that the function is strictly
increasing and strictly concave. By the implicit function theorem, we find that:
∂x˜i
(
X∗−{J,i}
)
∂X∗−{J,i}
=
U ′′xx(·)
C ′′xx(·)− U ′′xx(·)
< 0.
Thus, it is decreasing with an increase of the unchanged equilibrium allocation due to the concavity
of the utility function and the convexity of the cost function.
Hence, an increase of the number of sellers make X∗−{J,i}(N) increase as shown in lemma 9, and
by the previous lemma we know that the amount x˜1(N, J) decreases. In the limit, we have that
limN→∞ [x˜i(N, J)] ≈ x∗i (N). Thus, we have shown that with an arbitrarily number of active sellers,
the difference between the upper and the lower integrand of (B.8) tends to zero. We conclude that the
extra term causing the inefficiencies in the seller’s investment disappear and this tends to efficiency
limN→∞ [ζ(N)] ≈ 0 =⇒ σLC ≈ σE.
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We now show that the investment thresholds of the buyer also converge whenever the number of
active sellers is sufficiently large. The investment threshold for any J ⊂ N is
KJ ≡ TS∗(1, σ1J)− TS∗(0, σ0J)− κJ.
From above, we know that the investment of the seller tends to efficiency σJ ≈ σE, which im-
plies that the first part of the threshold also tends to efficiency limN→∞
[
TS∗(1, σ1J)− TS∗(0, σ0J)
] ≈
TS∗(1, σ1E)− TS∗(0, σ0E). By the same argument as before we can also show that the appropriation of
gains from trade by the sellers coming from an investment of the buyer tends to zero when the number
of sellers is arbitrarily large. Finally, the investing seller appropriation of investment tends to the
private cost of investment, that is, limN→∞ [κJ ] ≈ ψ(σ1E) − ψ(σ0E). Hence, with all things considered
we have that limN→∞ [KJ ] ≈ KE and the equilibrium investment profile tends to efficiency.
Proof of proposition 5: We begin by considering the case where the “allocative sensitivity” is
small. In this case, we have established that the investment threshold of the buyer is monotonically
decreasing the lower the level of competition ex-post. The lower partition of the surplus appropriated
by the buyer with lower competition dominates the higher investment of the seller. We start with the
case that the investment of the buyer is the same regardless of the level of competition ex-post. To
see that the investing seller is better-off with lower levels of competition we only need to verify that
his investment increases the lower is the level of competition and this is the case since we know that
∂γ(J)/∂J < 0. For the non-investing seller, it is easy to see that for any J ⊂ N and J 6= N \ {i} we
obtain
TS∗(b, σbJ)− T˜ S−i(b, σbJ | Ji) > TS∗(b, σbE)− TS∗−i(b, σbE)
=⇒ TS∗−i(b, σbE)− T˜ S−i(b, σbJ | Ji) > TS∗(b, σbE)− TS∗(b, σbJ) ≈ 0
=⇒ TS∗−i(b, σbE)− T˜ S−i(b, σbJ | Ji) > 0.
The right hand side of the second line is close to zero due to the fact that when the “allocative
sensitivity” is small, the investment of the seller is similar regardless to the equilibrium ex-post σbJ ≈
σbE. The third line is positive by point ii) in proposition 1. In a situation where the investment
of the buyer depends on the equilibrium played ex-post and because the “allocative sensitivity” is
small, we know that for any J ⊂ N we have that the investment threshold in the most competitive
equilibrium is the largest KHC > KJ . Because the sensitivity is small then there exist J ⊂ N and
σ1J > σ
0
LC. This implies that the largest payoff of the investing seller is achieved with an intermediate
level of competition. With regards to the non-investing sellers, we have that, the largest payoffs is
achieved with an intermediate level of competition. By the same procedure as before, we know that
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TS∗(1, σ1J)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1J | Ji) > TS∗(1, σ1E)− TS∗−i(1, σ1E). Therefore, we have that the largest payoff
is attained with a level of intermediate competition if
TS∗(1, σ1J)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1J | Ji) > TS∗(0, σ0LC)− T˜ S−i(0, σ0LC | J). (B.9)
Because the “allocative sensitivity” is small, we know that with a given investment of the buyer,
the investment of the seller will be similar. Hence, by lemma 5 and proposition 1 we know that
TS∗(1, σ1)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1 | Ji) > TS∗(0, σ0)− T˜ S−i(0, σ0 | Ji)
TS∗(0, σ0)− T˜ S−i(0, σ0 | J) > TS∗(0, σ0)− T˜ S−i(0, σ0 | Ji).
By summing up both expressions we have
T˜ S−i(0, σ0) < TS∗(1, σ1 | J)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1 | Ji) + TS∗(0, σ0)− 2
[
TS∗(0, σ0)− T˜ S−i(0, σ0 | Ji)
]
,
and by putting this in equation (B.9) we obtain
TS∗(1, σ1)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1 | Ji) > TS∗(0, σ0)− TS∗(1, σ1) + T˜ S−i(1, σ1 | Ji)− TS∗(0, σ0)
+ 2
[
TS∗(0, σ0)− T˜ S−i(0, σ0 | Ji)
]
=⇒ 2
[
TS∗(1, σ1)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1 | Ji)
]
> 2
[
TS∗(0, σ0)− T˜ S−i(0, σ0 | Ji)
]
,
where the last inequality holds again by lemma 5.
Whenever the “allocative sensitivity” is big, the proof is more involved. We have seen that if
the “allocative externally” is big there exists a subset of agents that undertake collective replacement
J ⊂ N such that KJ > KHC . For the investing seller it is easy to see that, as long as the investment
is higher with a less competitive equilibrium his payoffs are also higher. This is always the case
due to the complementarity of investment and that the buyer may decide to invest with a lower the
degree of competition. For the non investing seller the proof is simple. In the case where the fixed
costs of investment is such that the buyer invests in a lower competitive equilibrium we have that the
non-investing sellers are better with the highest competitive equilibrium. Therefore, we have that
TS∗(1, σ1J)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1J | Ji) < TS∗(0, σ0E)− TS∗−i(0, σ0E)
=⇒ TS∗(1, σ1J)− TS∗(0, σ0E) < T˜S−i(1, σ1J | Ji)− TS∗−i(0, σ0E); ∀J ∈ N,
where the left hand side represents the whole gain coming from the investment of the buyer and this
is positive. However, the right hand side is bigger and represents the gain in surplus when the buyer
is investing whenever any seller i 6= 1 is excluded from trade and this is proved in lemma 8 in the
49
appendix. Observe that whenever the investment decision of the buyer is equilibrium invariant, we
also have that the maximal surplus is attained with the highest level of competition since
TS∗(1, σ1E)− TS∗−i(1, σ1E) > TS∗(0, σ0E)− TS∗−i(0, σ0E) > TS∗(1, σ1J)− T˜ S−i(1, σ1J | Ji); ∀J ∈ N.
Proof of theorem 1: We start with the case when the allocative sensitivity is small. In the
previous section we stated that with a small “allocative sensitivity” the investment threshold of the
buyer is the biggest with the highest degree of competition, i.e KHC ≥ KJ ∀J ⊂ N . This entails
that the investment decision of the buyer is only efficient in any “tacitly” coordinating equilibrium
whenever it is also in the most competitive equilibrium. Then, it is immediate to see that, because
the investment decision of the seller in any “tacitly” coordinating equilibrium is inefficient as shown
in proposition 2, we obtain that the highest level of social welfare is obtained when competition is the
most severe.
We proceed by considering by analyzing when the “allocative sensitivity” is big. In this case,
we have established that the investment threshold of the buyer in an equilibrium where sellers tacitly
coordinate to bring competition down, might be above the one corresponding to the highest competitive
equilibrium. Here, we show that there exists a situation where the social welfare is bigger with less
competition. Therefore, in what follows, we consider the case where there exist a J ⊂ N such that
KHC < KJ . We define the difference in net social surplus as
D(·) = W J(1, σ1)−WHC(0, σ0) = TS∗(1, σ1J)−K − ψ(σ1J)− TS∗(0, σ0E) + ψ(σ0E).
Since we want to know if there exists a situation where a less competitive equilibrium does better,
we take the lowest possible value of the cost of investment of the buyer, which is K = KHC =
TS∗(1, σ1E) − TS∗(0, σ0E) − κHC . By introducing this in the previous expression we obtain that the
lower bound of the difference is given by:
D¯(·) = TS∗(1, σ1J)− TS∗(1, σ1E) + TS∗(0, σ0E) + κHC − ψ(σ1J)− TS∗(0, σ0E) + ψ(σ0E)
= TS∗(1, σ1J)− TS∗(1, σ1E) + κHC −
(
ψ(σ1J)− ψ(σ0E)
)
> TS∗(1, σ1J)− TS∗(1, σ1E) + ψ(σ1E)− ψ(σ0E)−
(
ψ(σ1J)− ψ(σ0E)
)
= TS∗(1, σ1J)− TS∗(1, σ1E)−
(
ψ(σ1J)− ψ(σ1E)
)
,
where the first inequality comes from the proof of proposition 3. Therefore, we will obtain that the
difference is positive, whenever the increase in the social surplus due to a higher investment of the seller
is bigger than the cost, i.e. TS∗(1, σ1J) − TS∗(1, σ1E) > ψ(σ1J) − ψ(σ1E) and therefore, we additionally
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require that the effect of the investment of the seller in the social surplus is sufficiently big. Observe
that because a lower degree of competition, that is, for J ′ ⊂ J , the investment of the seller is more
inefficient and the investemnt of the buyer stays the same, the level of net social welfare is decreased.
Consequently, the maximum is attained at J .
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